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Local contrasts across the language border identify the role of culture for unemployment. Our 
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Economists have long been interested in understanding the role of culture in shaping economic
outcomes because there is tremendous spatial variation in beliefs and values across countries
and regions. For instance, Alexis de Tocqueville's (1848) account of his 1831/1832 voyage to
the United States of America documents that he was fascinated by the di®erences in the core
values that shape the ways democracies work. But only until recently, Guiso et al. (2006)
have transformed culture from a vacuous concept to one with clear and testable predictions.
Clarifying that culture refers to the set of beliefs and values shared within religious, ethnic
or social groups with separate identities, this line of research has contributed strongly to our
understanding of the slow moving aspect of culture { the role of values and norms transmitted
from religious or political authorities or parents to their children (Guiso et al., 2006, Tabellini,
2005, Fern¶ andez, 2007).
Yet, it is to date not clear to what extent cultural di®erences in work norms and values a®ect
unemployment. While labor economics has contributed to understanding the role of institutions
in shaping equilibrium unemployment outcomes (Nickell and Layard, 1999), this literature can
not rationalize one of the most important facts in unemployment research { the existence of
strong di®erences in unemployment across regions of the same country (OECD 2005).
In this paper, we study how unemployment is a®ected by di®erences in culturally determined
attitudes towards work within a narrowly de¯ned geographic area. Our focus is Switzerland,
a country that is divided into two culturally distinct language regions: "Latin-speaking" (i.e.
French, Italian, or Romansh) regions and "German-speaking" regions. These regions are char-
acterized by strong di®erences in residents' attitudes towards the importance of work. For
instance, 78 % of people living in the German speaking part of Switzerland state that "I would
work even if I did not need the money", yet only 50 % of French or Italian- speaking survey
respondents agree with this statement.1 What is more, these di®erences in attitudes towards
work also translate into di®erences in actual voting behavior. Voters living in the Latin-speaking
regions tend to support limits to weekly working time much more strongly than people living in
the German-speaking regions of the country.
We explore to which extent these cultural di®erences in work attitudes a®ect unemployment.
The key idea is to focus on unemployment di®erences at the border between language regions.
It is widely recognized that Swiss language areas are associated with speci¯c cultural traits and
that the country is divided by an important cultural border: the RÄ ostigraben. This term {
referring to the German-Swiss way to prepare potatoes, RÄ osti { has become a metaphor for the
general cultural divide within the country.2 The clich¶ e is that German-Swiss are hard working,
historically used to spartan living conditions, being proud of their independence and deriving
1These ¯gures are from a 1998 survey on work attitudes conducted by University of Berne (Diekmann et al.
1998).
2Many commentators have written about the di®erences between these two cultural areas and speculated
about the implications of this cultural divide for the political and socio-economic stability of the country. For an
interesting recent contribution summarizing and taking stock of the debate, see BÄ uchi (2003).
1their identity from the founding myth of the Swiss federation. In contrast, Latin-Swiss are bon-
vivants enjoying the fruits of their temperate climate and, being a minority in the own country,
are much more outward-oriented (towards France and Italy, and the EU as a whole).3
There are three features of this language border which are of particular interest in the present
context. First, the dominant native language changes sharply at the RÄ ostigraben. Within a
geographical distance of 5 kilometers, the fraction of Latin speaking Swiss residents falls from
more than 90 percent to less than 5 percent (and vice versa for German native speakers). Since
language is central to the spreading of beliefs and norms and determines an individual's social
identity, the language barrier represents a sharp cultural barrier. Second, important segments
of the language border do not coincide with the borders of political jurisdictions, i.e. cantons.
This means we can separate e®ects of culture from e®ects of institutions. Third, an in-depth
analysis of key determinants of job search success suggests that these determinants do not vary
at the language border to an extent that could rationalize observed di®erences in unemployment.
This suggests that the language border is permeable and markets are integrated. These three
aspects allow separating the e®ects of culture on unemployment from the e®ects of institutions
and markets on unemployment.
To analyze language-border di®erentials in unemployment outcomes we use data from two
sources. The ¯rst data source comprises the universe of individuals entering unemployment over
the period 1998-2003. The main focus of our analysis is on Swiss men in the age group 25-60
{ more than 170,000 unemployment spells. A nice feature of this data set is that it provides
information on how the post-unemployment job was found: whether an individual found a new
job by own initiative or by placement via the local labor o±ce. This information is very helpful
in understanding the relative importance of individual search e®ort as a determinant of observed
unemployment di®erences at the language border. The second data source provides information
on all residents' employment status in the year 2000. This data source allows discussing the role
of culture in shaping other margins of labor supply { labor force participation and weekly hours
worked.
Our empirical results suggest that culture a®ects unemployment strongly. The ¯rst main
¯nding indicates a robust di®erence in unemployment durations at the language border. In-
dividuals living in Latin-speaking border communities { facing observationally identical labor
markets { tend to leave unemployment 7 weeks later than their neighbors living in German
speaking communities. This is a very large e®ect comparable to the impact of a drastic change
in the unemployment insurance system.4 Observed unemployment di®erences at the RÄ ostigraben
3Historically, Switzerland was founded by the German-speaking cantons Schwyz, Uri and Nidwalden, located
in the center of the country and was successively enlarged by the entrance of Berne, Zurich, Lucerne and other
cities of the German speaking part. Until the French invasion at the turn of the 19th century large parts of French
Switzerland were ruled by the German-speaking elites of Berne and Fribourg. In 1848, the new constitution with
26 cantons (of which 4 French speaking, 1 Italian speaking, 3 bilingual (French / German) cantons, and 18
German-speaking cantons) was adopted.
4Katz and Meyer (1990) estimate that a 10 week increase in potential bene¯t duration increases the average
duration of unemployment by about 1 week. Hence the di®erence in unemployment durations generated at the
2are unlikely to re°ect di®erences in labor demand on locally segregated labor markets. On the
one hand, in communities located close to the language border, a large fraction of residents cross
this border when going to work. This suggests that the labor market is highly integrated. On
the other hand, we do not see major di®erences in unemployment durations at the RÄ ostigraben
among migrants who neither speak German nor a Latin language. This group of immigrants
is subject to the same local labor market conditions but is unlikely to share native residents'
attitudes and norms concerning work e®ort and job search behavior.
Our second main ¯nding concerns the way in which unemployed individuals ¯nd a new job.
We ¯nd that Latin-speaking job seekers are much less likely to ¯nd a job on their own initiative
and slightly more likely to ¯nd a job mediated by the local labor o±ce than German-speaking
job seekers. This result provides further support for the claim that di®erences in local labor
market conditions are unlikely to account for observed unemployment outcomes. It also rules
out that discrimination by employers against Latin-speaking job seekers is the main explanation
for observed unemployment di®erences. If lack of jobs and/or discrimination were the main
drivers, the two exit channels would both account for the observed unemployment di®erences. In
contrast, if unemployment di®erences are generated by di®erential values and norms concerning
job seekers' adequate search e®ort, we will see a direct impact on the probability to ¯nd a
job by own initiative but no negative impact on the rate of job o®ers mediated by the public
employment o±ce.
Our third main ¯nding concerns the relative importance of vertical versus horizontal trans-
mission of culture. To separate these two channels we contrast the role of the individual's native
language to the role of the dominant native language of one's community in explaining unem-
ployment duration. An individual's native language is a proxy for the vertical transmission of
culture, i.e. values and norms transmitted from parents to their children (conditional on ability
to speak the dominant language spoken in the local labor market). In contrast, a community's
dominant native language proxies the norms and values prevalent in an individual's place of res-
idence. Our results indicate that cultural attitudes towards work in one's community are more
important than individual attitudes. This suggests that the horizontal transmission of cultural
values and the impact of attitudes towards work and job search are quantitatively important
determinants of unemployment durations.
Our paper is related to a new literature that has begun to analyze the impact of culture on
various labor market outcomes. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2006) investigate why Amer-
icans work so much more than Europeans. They argue European labor market regulations
in°uenced leisure patterns and created a "leisure culture" through a social multiplier (the re-
turns to leisure are higher when more people are taking longer vacations). A model based
on such complementarities in leisure performs better in explaining US-European di®erences in
working hours than a model that is based on di®erences in taxation (Prescott 2004). Fern¶ andez
and Fogli (2006, 2009) ¯nd that work (and fertility) behavior of married second-generation im-
RÄ ostigraben to an increase in potential bene¯t duration by much more than one year!
3migrant women is signi¯cantly a®ected by the country of heritage. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that current economic outcomes are a®ected by the culture of the country of origin.
Fern¶ andez (2007) shows that attitudes in the country of ancestry towards women's market work
and housework have explanatory power for current labor market participation. The particular
role of "family culture" on labor market outcomes are investigated in Algan and Cahuc (2005)
and Alesina and Giuliano (2007). These studies ¯nd that strong family ties reduce labor force
participation. Ichino and Maggi (2000) study cultural di®erences in the propensity to shirk
(absenteeism and misconduct) using data from a large Italian bank. A further related strand of
the literature has focused on the emergence and support for labor market institutions such as
the unemployment insurance system. Algan and Cahuc (2009) argue that cultural di®erences
can explain why some countries implement di®erent mixes of employment protection and un-
employment insurance. Lindbeck et al. (2003), and Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) consider the
dynamics of work ethics and how these dynamics interact with the evolution of welfare state
provisions.5
This paper contributes to the literature in at least three respects. First, this paper provides
novel quasi-experimental evidence on the role of culture for unemployment outcomes. Limit-
ing the empirical analysis to a narrowly de¯ned geographic area helps separating the cultural
component of unemployment from other relevant explanations for di®erences in unemployment.
Second, we separate the role of vertical and horizontal transmission. In doing so, we complement
the results from the epidemiological approach to studying culture (Fern¶ andez, 2007) and results
from the IV approach to studying the role of culture (Guiso et al. 2006). Both the epidemio-
logical approach and the IV approach do not discuss the relevance of social spillovers of culture
{ the fast moving aspect of culture. Understanding this is important from an economic point of
view. If cultural di®erences in individual norms and values do not spill over to other individuals,
culture will not be able to rationalize much of the variance in regional unemployment. However,
if culturally shaped attitudes towards working spill over to other individuals, micro di®erences in
attitudes build up to macro di®erences in behavior. Third, to our knowledge, our paper provides
the ¯rst study that assesses the causal impact of culture on unemployment. In this sense we
shed light on the role of culture in shaping one of the most important socio-economic outcomes
that has not been studied so far.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide back-
ground on unemployment and the unemployment insurance in Switzerland as well as on the
language regions and their cultural di®erences. Section 3 presents the identi¯cation strategy
used, namely the spatial regression discontinuity design, and describes the various data sources
5Two further strands of the literature are related. A theoretical strand considers the transmission of cultural
values from parents to children. See e.g. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001, 2004) on marriage and religion, Hauk
and Saez Marti (2002) on corruption, Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) on class-speci¯c preferences and the industrial
revolution. Other empirical studies have looked at the role of of culture in explaining the demand for redistribution
(Alesina and Fuchs-SchÄ undeln 2007), economic performance (Tabellini 2005), or trade (Guiso et al. 2009; Thoenig
et al 2009), and horizontal spillovers in unemployment outcomes (Stutzer and Lalive 2004; Clark 2003; Kolm 2005).
4that we use in the empirical analysis. Sections 4 to 6 detail our empirical strategy to assess the
impact of culture on unemployment, present our main empirical results and provide sensitivity
analyzes. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutions and Language Regions
2.1 Unemployment and unemployment insurance in Switzerland
One crucial fact, puzzling policy makers and researchers alike, are large and persistent di®er-
ences in unemployment rates between the German-speaking and the Latin-speaking parts of the
country. Figure 1 shows that, during the period 1997-2006, unemployment rates were between
1.5 and 2 times as large in Latin-Swiss as compared to German-Swiss cantons. This di®erence is
to a large extent driven by a longer duration of unemployment spells in Latin-speaking regions.
The percentage long-term unemployed { the fraction of individuals being in the unemployment
pool since more than a year { has been up to twice as large in Latin-speaking cantons during
the period 1997-2006. This suggests that di®erences in unemployment durations are key to
understand di®erences in unemployment rates between language regions in Switzerland.
Figure 1: Unemployment rates in Latin-speaking versus German-speaking cantons
Source: data from Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), Neuch^ atel.
To what extent can these di®erences be rationalized by di®erences in unemployment in-
surance? Unemployment insurance is organized at the national level. Federal unemployment
bene¯t rules are relatively generous. Maximum bene¯t duration is 2 years. The marginal re-
placement rate is 70 % or 80 % depending on the presence of dependent family members and
previous income. Job seekers are entitled to these bene¯ts if they have paid unemployment
5insurance taxes for at least six months in the two years prior to registering at the public em-
ployment service (PES) and if they are capable of doing a regular job. Entitlement criteria to
unemployment bene¯ts also include compliance with job search requirements and participation
in active labor market programs. Potential job o®ers are supplied by the public vacancy in-
formation system of the PES, from private temporary help ¯rms or from the job seeker's own
pool of potential jobs. Non-compliance with any of these obligations is sanctioned by complete
withdrawal of bene¯ts for a period that can last up to 30 work days (see Lalive et al 2005
for details on the Swiss sanction system). This means that di®erences in bene¯t duration and
level can not explain di®erences in regional unemployment. Yet regions have an important role
in implementing counseling and monitoring practices thus potentially contributing to regional
di®erences in unemployment (Lalive et al 2005, Ger¯n and Lechner 2002, Froelich and Lechner
2004). The empirical analysis will pay particular attention to the role of di®erences in policy
implementation in explaining regional unemployment.
2.2 Language regions and attitudes toward works
To which extent can regional di®erences in unemployment be explained by cultural di®erences
between language regions? To shed light on this issue we look at di®erences in attitudes towards
work by language regions. Switzerland has four o±cial languages.6 The North East of Switzer-
land speaks Swiss German, the West speaks French, the South East speaks Italian, and some
parts of the East speak Romansh. According to the population census 2000, 72.5 percent of
Swiss citizens speak German, 21.0 percent speak French, 4.3 percent speak Italian, 0.6 percent
speak Romansh and 1.6 percent speak other languages (LÄ udi and Werlen, 2005).7 The empirical
analysis contrasts the regions speaking languages derived from Latin { French, Italian, Romansh
{ with the regions speaking German. Figure 1 displays a map of all communities of Switzer-
land shaded according to their majority language (light shading = majority speaks German;
dark shading = majority speaks language derived from Latin). Note that thin lines separate
communities, and thick lines separate the 26 Swiss cantons (i.e. states).
Large parts of the language border are neither a geographical barrier nor an institutional
border. On the one hand, the most important segment of the language border runs from North
to South (the border between French-speaking and German-speaking regions) whereas the main
geographical barrier, the Alps, are in East-West direction. This fact, together with a very
e±cient (public) transportation system implies that transport costs within language regions
are similar to transport costs across language regions (conditional on distance). On the other
hand, important segments of the language border do not coincide with borders between cantons
6Switzerland has 7.5 million inhabitants populating an area of 41,300 sq km (15,900 sq mi) with implies a
population density of 180 residents per sq km (480 residents per sq mi).
7The numbers in the text refer to the Swiss citizens. Roughly 20 percent of residents are immigrants of which
62.3 percent speak either German, French, Italian or Romansh and 37.7 percent have some other ¯rst language.
Romansh is one of the Rhaeto-Romance languages, believed to have descended from the Vulgar Latin variety
spoken by Roman era occupiers of the region, and, as such, is closely related to French, Occitan and North
Italian.
6Figure 2: Language regions in Switzerland
Notes: White-shaded areas are communities in which the majority of the pop-
ulation speaks German, gray-shaded areas are communities with the majority
speaking either French, Italian or Romansh. Source: data from Federal Statisti-
cal O±ce (FSO), Neuch^ atel.
(dark lines). Speci¯cally, there are three cantons { Berne, Fribourg, and Valais { feature both
a German speaking and a French speaking part and are o±cially bilingual. Thus, people living
on di®erent sides of the language border actually face predominantly the same regional set of
policies and institutions.
The key argument of this paper is that linguistic groups in Switzerland have adopted di®erent
attitudes towards working. Language is central to this idea for at least three reasons. First,
language is a key source of identity (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008) and language is central to
mixing { genetic markers di®er more strongly between people living in Latin Swiss area and
the German Swiss area than within those regions (Novembre et al. 2008). Second, the Latin
Swiss identity is di®erent from the German Swiss identity. Large parts of French-speaking
Switzerland have been dominated by the German Swiss oppressors from Berne during 250 years
creating a desire for the French Swiss to distinguish themselves from the ruling German elites
and their cultural heritage. Third, the French Swiss live in a climate that has always been very
forthcoming. In contrast, the German Swiss nourish the founding myth of the mountain peasant
working hard to survive in remote areas of the Alps. The Latin Swiss lean towards their large
neighbors whereas the German Swiss emphasize neutrality and independence.8
8This pattern is clearly evident in the voting decisions in a referendum on joining the European Economic Area
(1992). Whereas the Latin Swiss overwhelmingly supported integration, the German Swiss did not. Switzerland
accommodates di®erent cultures via a mix of strong federalism and education policy. Yet, Switzerland pays
particular care to the fact that all federal laws are translated in all four languages. Bilingual cantons (Fribourg,
7Is there any evidence of cultural di®erences in attitudes towards work? The Swiss module
of the International Social Survey Programme provides information on the importance of work
(ISSP 1997 and 2005). ISSP data contains information on the extent to which survey respondents
agree with the statement "I would enjoy a paid job even if I did not need the money". Breaking
responses down by interview language, Table 1 shows that German speaking respondents indicate
much stronger support for the statement than respondents speaking French, Italian or Romansh.
Moreover, support for this statement is stronger in the German speaking region both during a
recession (1997 unemployment rate 5.1 %) as well as in a period of economic upswing (2005
unemployment rate 3.8 %).
Table 1: Importance of Work across Language Groups
Year Latin German Di®erence
Enjoy a paid job even if I did not need the moneya 1997 3.26 2.60 0.65***
Enjoy a paid job even if I did not need the moneya 2005 2.58 2.26 0.32***
Notes:
a 1=strongly agree, 2="agree", 3="indi®erent", 4="disagree", 5="strongly disagree". This
table reports the average disagreement with the statement "I would enjoy a paid job even if I did
not need the money" by interview language.
Source: ISSP 1997 and 2005, own calculations.
These di®erences in attitudes towards work as measured in the ISSP data translate into
actual voting behavior. The Swiss direct democratic system provides us with the possibility to
test the hypothesis that in Latin-speaking parts of the country individuals have di®erent tastes
for leisure than in the German-speaking parts of the country. Voter initiatives are a crucial
part of the political system and have a long tradition in Switzerland. Basically, anyone who
collects more than 100,000 signatures can force the parliament to subject her or his change to
the constitution to the popular vote. Over the last years, various voter initiatives { related to
working time regulations (the "intensive" margin) { were held at the national level.
In 1985, all Swiss nationals aged 18 years or older { the voting age population { were asked
to vote on whether to increase paid vacations to a minimum of 4 weeks; in 1988 whether to
reduce regular weekly working time to 40 hours; and in 2002 whether to reduce weekly working
time to 36 hours. Moreover, there were three referenda related to lifetime work regulations
(the "extensive" margin): in 1988 the population had to vote whether to reduce the statutory
retirement age from 65 to 62 for men and from 62 to 60 for women; in 2000 whether to make
early retirement more attractive to all workers; and in another vote in 2000 whether to leave
the statutory retirement age for women at age 62 (rather than increasing it to 65 years). Table
1 displays the voting results of these six votes, separately for German-speaking and for Latin-
speaking cantons.
Valais, Berne) provide all state laws in both French and German. Politicians speak their native language but
they are expected to understand any of the other languages. The second pillar supporting the Swiss multilingual
situation is education. Children learn to speak another \Swiss" language as their second language before they can
opt for English. (This has changed recently, however. While this has been understood as key to holding the Swiss
confederation together, English has started to become the ¯rst foreign language in many schools in the German
speaking part of Switzerland).
8Table 2: Voting results by language region of six votes on working time regulations
% Yes in % Yes in % Yes
Latin Region German Region Total
Panel A, "intensive margin"
Longer vacations (1985) 0.444 0.314 0.348
Less working hours (1988) 0.436 0.311 0.343
Less working time (2002) 0.354 0.226 0.259
Panel B, "extensive margin"
Reduce retirement age (1988) 0.463 0.310 0.350
Downward °exible retirement age (2000) 0.625 0.402 0.460
No increase of retirement age for women (2000) 0.562 0.336 0.394
Notes: This table shows mean approval for a series of national voter initiatives regarding the duration
of work di®erentiated by the language spoken by the majority of residents in the community. German
= cantons with a German speaking majority, Latin = cantons with a French or Italian speaking
majority. Voter turnout has been 34.97% for vote 1, 52.86% for vote 2, 58.26% for vote 3, 42.04% for
vote 4, 41.71% for vote 5, 41.66% for vote 6. There are no di®erences in turnout accross language
regions.
Source: Community level data from Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuch^ atel.
Table 2 shows that there are strong di®erences in voting results between the two language
regions and that the Latin-speaking cantons are consistently much more in favor of regulations
that allow workers to enjoy more leisure. For instance, in the 1985 referendum, 44.4 percent
of the population in Latin-speaking cantons voted in favor of longer vacations whereas only
31.4 percent were in favor of such a regulation in the German speaking cantons. The 1988 and
2002 votes on weekly working time reductions show very similar di®erences. The same picture
emerges when we look at di®erences in voting behavior on issues related to (early) retirement
rules. Over all six referenda, the percentage yes-votes is between 1.4 and 1.7 times as large in
the Latin-speaking regions as opposed to the German-speaking regions. We consider this as ¯rst
evidence consistent with a higher prevalence of a "leisure culture" in Latin-speaking regions as
opposed to "workaholic" attitudes in German-speaking regions.
Local unemployment may clearly also a®ect support for work time reductions { through the
"lump of work fallacy", for instance. How important is this reverse channel of causation? We can
discuss this by contrasting the votes that took place in the late 1980s where the unemployment
rate stood below 1 % and with the three votes that took place in 2000 (unemployment rate 2 %)
and 2002 (unemployment rate 2.5 %), respectively. The language region di®erential in support
for weekly work time reductions amounts to roughly 12 - 13 % regardless of the aggregate
unemployment rate. In contrast, support for proposals to reduce the retirement age is much
higher in early 2000 than in 1988 suggesting that voting on early retirement is sensitive to
unemployment. Nevertheless, the strong di®erences in voting on work time reductions are also
likely to re°ect strong di®erences in cultural attitudes towards working across Swiss language
regions.
93 Data and Identi¯cation
3.1 Data
Data on unemployment duration and level is drawn from two sources. We use unemployment
register data from the years 1998-2003 collected by the local public employment service. Once
a job seeker ¯les a claim for unemployment bene¯ts, the case worker enters this claim into the
so-called AVAM/ASAL system of the ministry of labor. This system registers the date the claim
starts as well as a wealth of information on the individual. Job seekers then see the caseworker
on a regularly basis and any new information is updated in the system. A job seeker leaves the
database either when he or she ¯nds a new job or for "unknown reasons" (does not show up any
more; has moved to a di®erent region; or has exhausted unemployment bene¯ts). A nice feature
of the AVAM/ASAL database is information on the way a job seeker found a new job: (i) by own
initiative or (ii) by placement via the local labor o±ce. This information will be of particular
importance in the empirical analysis below. We use 2000 census data to construct a survey based
measure of labor force participation and full vs part time employment. In the decennial census,
respondents are asked to provide information on their employment status. We can therefore
re-construct a snapshot of the Swiss labor force in December 2000 { the (biblical) reference date
for the census. Moreover, census data allows discussing whether the unemployment data from
administrative sources agree with survey data on labor supply.
Our unemployment in°ow analysis is based on Swiss men aged 25 - 60 because female labor
supply may be a®ected by both di®erences in work culture and family culture. The lower age
bound is set to ensure that the unemployed in our sample have (mostly) ¯nished their education.
The upper bound is set to avoid any unemployment spells that directly allow for early retirement.
We also restrict attention to people in our sample who are registered as full-time unemployed
who are entitled to unemployment bene¯ts. This selection does not critically lower the number
of unemployment spells in our sample but it does ensure a homogeneous sample. The census
analysis is based on Swiss men aged 15-64 years in the census. We also focus on younger and
older age groups to discuss labor market entry and exit.
Both data sources contain information on the socio-economic background of job seekers
and census respondents as well as information on the place of residence. Whereas the census
data contains information on place of work, the unemployment register data neither informs
on where job seekers worked before entering unemployment nor where they work after leaving
unemployment. We supplement these data sources with important information characterizing
the socio-demographic structure of the community of residence, information on labor demand,
and on the implementation of labor market policy. Individual controls include socio-economic
characteristics as reported in the AVAM/ASAL data base as well as information on previous
employment: age, marital status, number of dependent family members, willingness to commute
or move, education, quali¯cation, the sector of previous employment (agriculture, manufactur-
ing, construction, services, tourism, other), previous insured earnings, and the assessment of the
caseworker w.r.t. the ease of ¯nding a suitable job. Community controls are taken from the
10Swiss population census 2000 and consists of: structure of population/employment by 5-year age
groups, 5 education groups, and three sectors as well as the percentage of men and immigrants
living in the respective community, the total number of inhabitants, and if the community be-
longs to an agglomeration area or not. Labor demand controls are measured at the community
level and include the number of vacancies posted from January to June 2000 per employed res-
ident in the working age population, the 1998 number of jobs, the 1998-2001 changes in both
the number of jobs and the number of ¯rms, and the median wage of each community. This
information is based on the Swiss ¯rm censuses 1998 and 2001. Finally, ALMP controls include
monthly time varying entry rates into four types of active labor market programs (basic course,
training programs, employment programs, subsidized jobs) and the bene¯t sanction rates drawn
from the AVAM/ASAL database.
To apply the spatial regression discontinuity design, we organize the data in the following
way: for each community c we calculate the driving distance in kilometers to get from community
c to the closest community on the other side of the language border.9 To re°ect both distance
and language region, we code the distance measure negatively for communities in the German-
speaking regions and positively for the Latin-speaking regions. For instance, Geneva { the
Westernmost city { is located +150 km away from the barrier, St. Gallen, the largest city in
the East is {170 km away from the border. Zurich is {100 km away and Lausanne is +65 km
away from the language barrier. The city of Fribourg (capital of the bilingual canton Fribourg)
is located exactly on the language barrier.
3.2 Identi¯cation
Comparing unemployment rates in Latin-speaking versus German-speaking cantons as in Fig-
ure 1 is suggestive for a potential role of culture for unemployment, but we can not interpret
this evidence as causal. While attitudes towards work appear to di®er between ethnic groups
delineated by language in Switzerland, a simple comparison of these groups is unlikely to be in-
formative on the e®ects of culture on unemployment. Regional di®erences in industry structure,
education, or shocks to labor demand are clear confounders. To assess whether observed dif-
ferences in unemployment durations and incidence are causally a®ected by di®erences in norms
and values we propose a spatial regression discontinuity approach. Let Yic be the duration of
unemployment experienced by individual i living in community c. Let PLc ´ Ec(Li) denote the
fraction of Latin speakers in the community of residence c of individual i. The following model
captures both the e®ect of individual values on unemployment, and the e®ects of cultural values
in the group on the individual (i.e. the community).
9Driving distance may not re°ect driving time { a more direct measure of opportunity costs of distance. Note,
however, that the key purpose of the distance measure is to identify border communities. Identi¯cation of these
communities does not strongly depend on the nature of the distance measure. For instance, using air distance
between communities delivers similar results as using driving distance. This suggests that our main results are
not driven by the distance measure we use.
11Yic = ® + ¯Li + °PLc + ºic (1)
The parameter ¯ captures the role of individual culture for unemployment. The idea is that
individuals who have been raised in di®erent cultural environments may have di®erent attitudes
towards work which in turn shape their job search behavior when unemployed. Thus ¯ measures
the role of work values that are transmitted from parents to their children { the vertical channel
of cultural transmission. In contrast, the parameter ° captures the role of work culture prevailing
in the community of residence of the individual. Why may community culture be important?
There are at least three reasons for why a horizontal channel of transmission may be important.
First, social interactions between job seekers and other job seekers may lead to spillovers.10
These interactions may be endogenous { job seekers are unemployed longer because other's are
seeking for work longer { or contextual { job seekers are directly a®ected by cultural (language)
composition of their community. Second, culturally shaped attitudes towards working give rise
to work norms which are enforced via social sanctions. Third, the extent to which information
on job openings is shared between workers and job seekers may vary across cultural groups.
Clearly, simple least squares identi¯cation of the parameters will fail since language skills
are important in job ¯nding, and language groups tend to be located in di®erent geographical
regions with di®erent markets and institutions.11 How can we identify the role of work culture
on unemployment?
The key idea of spatial regression discontinuity is that geographic proximity preserves dif-
ferences in culture but lets di®erences in employment opportunities and institutions vanish.
In other words, observed di®erences in unemployment at the RÄ ostigraben re°ect di®erences in
behavior generated by di®erences in norms and values rather than by di®erences in labor mar-
kets and/or institutions. Local contrasts at the language border identify the e®ect of culture
on unemployment if this assumption is satis¯ed. Thus, let Sc denote the driving distance of
community c to the language border where Sc > 0 identi¯es a community in the Latin speak-
ing part and Sc < 0 is a community on the German speaking side of the language border (as
de¯ned in the previous subsection). Let E+(Y ) denote the limit of the expectation of Y on
the Latin side of the language border, i.e. E+(Y ) ´ lim²!0 E(Y jSc = ²), with E¡(Y ) denoting
the corresponding expectation when approaching the language border from the German side.
Contrasting unemployment outcomes as de¯ned in equation (1) at the border, we ¯nd that the
border contrast is composed of three components
10Note that the reduced form model 1 may be derived from a standard linear-in-means model of social







ic, where Ec(Yi) is the peer group average unemployment outcome.
The parameters in model (1) then represent the reduced form parameters obtained by replacing Ec(Yi) in the
linear-in-means model and solving for the underlying determinants. In particular ® = ®=(1 ¡ °













11Note that speci¯cation (1) imposes a homogeneity assumption on the treatment e®ect. Relaxing this assump-
tion does not lead to fundamentally di®erent conclusions regarding the conditions needed for identi¯cation but it
does change the interpretation of the identi¯ed e®ects (Hahn et al 2001).
12E+(Yi) ¡ E¡(Yi) = ¯[E+(Li) ¡ E¡(Li)] + °[E+(PLc) ¡ E¡(PLc)] + [E+(ºic) ¡ E¡(ºic)] (2)
This simple analysis shows two key results. The ¯rst result is that we can identify whether
culture plays any role or not by investigating whether labor market outcomes are discontinuous
at the language border. The key idea in this result is that a language barrier separates culture
(giving rise to discontinuities in own culture and other's culture) without separating markets.
Thus, the key underlying identifying assumption for (2) to provide valid causal evidence on any
role of culture is that the error term ºic is mean independent of the language region at the
language border. In other words, the identifying assumption is that there are no unobserved
di®erences in regional labor market development at the language border. There are three impor-
tant concerns with this assumption: unemployment di®erences could simply re°ect (i) regional
di®erences in labor market opportunities; (ii) regional di®erences in how unemployment insur-
ance is implemented; and/or (iii) sorting across the language border. Section 4 below discusses
the validity of these concerns in detail. The key result of that discussion is that labor demand
is balanced, labor market policy changes at the language border in ways that are unlikely to be
quantitatively important, and there is no sorting across the language border among migrants,
arguably the most mobile group.
We propose to measure the contrast (2) in the context of a simple linear regression. Let
Lc = 1 if more than 50 % of Swiss residents of community c speak French, Italian, or Romansh,
and Lc = 0 if the majority's language is German. Consider the following linear regression
Yi = ¼0 + ¼1Lc + ¼2Sc + ¼3LcSc + X0
ic± + ºic (3)
where Xic is a vector of variables that capture di®erences between individuals, communities,
markets, and local labor market policies. Furthermore, the vector Xic contains a full set of
canton and time dummies to account for unobserved di®erences between states and over time.
The terms in Sc and LcSc capture a two sided linear trend between unemployment duration
and distance to language border. The parameter estimate for ¼1 is a consistent estimate of (2),
provided that our speci¯cation appropriately captures di®erences in unemployment outcomes
across regions.
The second result of the analysis (2) is that contrasting unemployment outcomes does not
allow di®erentiating between vertical and horizontal transmission of culture. Because both indi-
vidual language and the community's language change discontinuously at the language border,
the parameter ¼1 measures the overall e®ect of culture on unemployment. How can we dis-
entangle the e®ects of one's own cultural values from the e®ect of one's neighbors culture?
Understanding the role of vertical cultural transmission requires shutting down the channel of
horizontal cultural transmission, i.e. contrasting individuals with di®erent native languages Li
in the same language region Lc { as is common in the epidemiological approach to identifying
culture (Fern¶ andez 2007). In principle, this is possible because there is within region variation
13in native language. About 6 % of all job seekers who live in the Latin speaking region have a
mother who spoke German, and about 3 % of all job seekers in the German speaking region
spoke either French, Italian or Romansh with their mother. The key problem with this iden-
ti¯cation strategy is that it requires comparing people who do not live in the region speaking
their native language (movers) with job seekers who live in a region that speaks their language
(stayers). There are at least three reasons why these two groups might di®er. First, not speaking
the region's language may harm labor market success. Second, movers tend to be a positively
selected group of the overall population. Third, movers may adapt to the prevailing cultural
values.
How relevant are these concerns? First, note that we can measure the role of vertical trans-
mission of values both in the Latin speaking and the German speaking region. If there are any
di®erences in unobserved labor market chances ºic between movers and stayers, we will detect
this in terms of an asymmetric estimate of the role of vertical transmission ¯.12 Second, note
that adaptation is a problem for all studies adopting the epidemiological approach. Adaptation
to local cultural values tends to decrease the importance of vertical cultural transmission thus
changing the parameter being identi¯ed. While the full extent of vertical transmission can not
be detected with mover stayer contrasts, they capture the extent to which cultural values persist
in situations where the individual is exposed to other cultures. Moreover, we will go one step
beyond existing studies in measuring the vertical transmission of culture in the bilingual city
of Fribourg. Fribourg provides us with a unique situation where two cultural groups reside in
the same geographic location in a non-segregated fashion. This suggests that residents of Fri-
bourg are similarly a®ected by horizontal transmission of culture allowing us to study the role
of vertical transmission without adaptation.
Our empirical identi¯cation strategy to separate vertical and horizontal transmission pro-
ceeds as follows. We control for language skills by adding the information on one's native
language not being equal to the language spoken by the majority in the community, i.e. Nic ´
Li 6= Lc. This variable captures the extent to which individuals whose native language is not
identical to the local language experience di®erential unemployment durations than individuals
who are able to speak the local language perfectly. Speci¯cally, we modify equation (3) as follows
Yi = ® + ¯Li + ¼1Lc + ±Nic + ¼2Sc + ¼3LcSc + X0
ic± + ºic (4)
12To see this, note that comparing Latin to German speaking job seekers in the Latin region provides information
on E(YijLi = 1;Lc = 1) ¡ E(YijLi = 0;Lc = 1) = ¯ + E(ºicjLi = 1;Lc = 1) ¡ E(ºicjLi = 0;Lc = 1)
whereas comparing Latin to German speaking job seekers in the German speaking region of Switzerland measures
E(YijLi = 1;Lc = 0)¡E(YijLi = 0;Lc = 0) = ¯ +E(ºicjLi = 1;Lc = 0)¡E(ºicjLi = 0;Lc = 0). These contrasts
only measure the same parameter if a) there is no stayer mover di®erence in labor market skills, or b) if there is
stayer advantage in the Latin region but a stayer disadvantage in the German region { or vice versa. Asymmetric
stayer advantage in labor market success is not plausible because language skills are likely to favor stayers in
both language regions, and movers are arguably positively selected from the respective populations. Even though
tougher labor market competition in the German region introduces some asymmetry in the labor market skills of
movers to the German and to the Latin region, the two contrasts would still provide di®erent estimates.
144 The e®ect of culture on unemployment
In this section we assess whether there exist signi¯cant discontinuities in unemployment du-
rations at the RÄ ostigraben. We start by documenting the signi¯cance of the RÄ ostigraben as a
language barrier and show the extent to which unemployment durations change at the language
border. Under the assumption that geographic proximity to this language barrier preserves
di®erences in culture but does not imply a segmentation of labor markets and the institutional
environment, observed di®erences in unemployment outcomes can be interpreted as the causal
e®ect of culture on unemployment. To check the plausibility of this identifying assumption we
proceed as follows. We address in detail the key concern that the RÄ ostigraben is a barrier that
segments labor markets. We then go one step further and provide detailed regression analyzes
that check to which extent observed language-border di®erences can be attributed to standard
explanations commonly associated with di®erences in unemployment outcomes.
4.1 Discontinuities in language and unemployment
We start by exploring how sharply the dominant native language changes at the RÄ ostigraben.
Figure 3 shows the percentage unemployed with Latin (i.e. French or Italian) native language
by distance to the language border. The ¯gure clearly demonstrates that the RÄ ostigraben is
a sharp language barrier. In the German-speaking parts of the country (negative distance
measure) the percentage of Latin native speakers is very small, considerably less than 10 percent.
More importantly, the percentage native Latin speakers does not show a clear trend when we
approach the RÄ ostigraben. At the language border, there is a sudden jump from about 20 percent
Latin-speakers on the side of the German language area to more than 80 percent on the Latin-
dominated side. Notice that this change occurs within a distance of 10 km, the grid adopted
in the Figure. Hence we conclude that the language border delineates quite sharply the two
language regions.
In Section 2 above we have already documented the striking di®erences in unemployment
outcomes between German-speaking and the Latin-speaking cantons. If culture is a ¯rst-order
determinant of these di®erences we should see a discontinuous change in unemployment not
only between entire language areas, but also at the RÄ ostigraben. In Figure 4, we draw the
average duration of unemployment experienced by residents located at di®erent distances from
this border. This graph clearly shows a strong discontinuity of average unemployment durations
at the language border. On the German-speaking side the average duration of unemployment
is about 29 weeks. On the Latin-speaking side the corresponding value is about 35 weeks. In
either direction, we do not observe a strong trend (with respect to distance from the border) in
unemployment outcomes.
Table 3 presents unemployment durations for the two language regions together with two
estimates for the di®erential at the language border. Row 1 suggests that the di®erence in un-
employment duration between language regions is very high (10 weeks), but probably driven to
some extent by di®erent economic structures (column 4). Using model (3) without controls, we
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estimate the corresponding di®erence directly at the language border (column 5). This estimate
may be biased if the relationship between unemployment duration and distance to langauge
16border is misspeci¯ed. Addressing this important issue, we therefore report estimates of model
(3) that only use information from three bilingual German/French cantons (Fribourg / Valais /
Berne). Findings in column (6) show that the language border di®erence in unemployment dura-
tion remains at a level of 6 weeks. Row 2 in Table 3 also presents estimates for log unemployment
duration which should be less a®ected by outliers. Results indicate that log unemployment dura-
tion increases by .19 points using information on all Switzerland or by .21 points using bilingual
cantons. These estimates translate into changes of unemployment duration that are of similar
order of magnitude as the duration estimates.
Table 3: Summary statistics: Dependent variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Latin German Di®erence Di®erence at border
All Bilingual cantons
Unemployment duration (weeks) 32.12 39.12 29.07 10.05*** 6.34*** 6.18***
Log unemployment duration 4.89 5.16 4.77 .38*** .19*** .21***
No. of observations 173072 52317 120755 173072 34528
Notes: Latin = majority in community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Di®erence at the border
is estimated using linear speci¯cations. Source: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss
Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
Notice that a 6 weeks di®erence in unemployment durations is quantitatively signi¯cant.
To see recall the e®ects of unemployment insurance parameters as estimated e.g. by Katz
and Meyer (1990). Their analysis indicates that an increase in maximum bene¯t duration by
10 weeks increases actual durations of unemployment by one week. Extrapolating this e®ect
linearly, a six-week di®erence in unemployment duration arises from increasing the maximum
bene¯t duration of unemployment bene¯ts by more than a whole year! We therefore conclude
that the di®erence in unemployment durations at the RÄ ostigraben is strikingly large. To what
extent is this di®erence driven by di®erences in labor demand and labor market integration?
4.2 Does the RÄ ostigraben segment labor markets?
An obvious concern against the cultural interpretation of language-border e®ects in unemploy-
ment outcomes is that these di®erences may re°ect labor market conditions. We address this
central issue in two di®erent ways.
First, we explore the extent to which labor markets are integrated by looking at the extent
of daily commuting across the language border. The idea is that, with a substantial pool of
commuters, di®erences in labor market conditions should be arbitraged away by worker mobility.
To the extent that this is the case, our identifying assumption becomes more plausible. Figure
5a draws the percentage of daily commuters who cross the RÄ ostigraben when going to work,
by distance to the language border of the residence community. (The ¯gure is based on data
17from the Swiss population census 2000). The ¯gure shows that about 8 percent of employed
residents of German border communities commute to a workplace located in the Latin area. In
contrast, about 14 percent of employed residents of Latin border communities commute to the
German speaking area. This shows that the language border is permeable. The second ¯nding
is that whereas the share of within canton migration is symmetric, excess cross border work
mobility arises due to residents of Latin border communities taking jobs in the German area
outside of their canton of residence. The asymmetry in across region mobility indicates that
there are features of the German side of the language border which make it more attractive to
Latin residents than vice-versa. On the other hand, the ¯nding of balanced within canton cross
language border mobility indicates that the asymmetry does not arise within but across cantons.
We consider such a high extent of mobility across the language border as strong evidence in favor
of an integrated labor market and against the concern that the RÄ ostigraben is a rift that segments
local labor markets.
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Notes: negative=German-speaking part; positive=French-/Italian-speaking part. Figure a shows the share
of workers crossing the language border to reach their place of work, where a solid line = all workers, a
dashed line = workers crossing the language border to a place of work in their canton of residence, a dotted
line = workers crossing the language border to a workplace that is outside the canton of residence. Figure
b shows the share of workers commuting for more than 30 minutes to reach their place of work.
Source: Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), Neuch^ atel.
Commuting times also allow studying the extent of labor market integration. If the language
barrier separates markets, workers living close to the border will be forced to search further
away from their place of residence. This suggests that commuting times will tend to be higher
in communities that are close to the language border than in communities that are further away
from the border. The empirical evidence is exactly in contrast to this idea (Figure 5b). Both in
the Latin speaking area and in the German speaking area, commuting times tend to be lower
closer to the border than further away. What is more, there is no discontinuity in the fraction
commuting more than 30 minutes to their workplace at the langauge border. This evidence
suggests both that the language border does not constrain job search radius in a one sided
fashion and that commuting patterns are similar at the language border.
The second question is whether labor market success would be identical in the absence of
18cultural di®erences. A direct measure of labor demand is the number of open vacancies in each
community per employed person (Figure 6a). The Swiss ¯rm census provides information on all
vacancies that were created by ¯rms between January and June 2000. Interestingly, the ¯gure
suggests that the vacancy to employment rate is slightly higher on the Latin speaking side of
the language border. This suggests that labor market chances are slightly better on the Latin
side of the language border than on the German speaking side of the language border.
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Notes: negative=German-speaking part; positive=French-/Italian-speaking part. Figure a shows the vacan-
cies posted by ¯rms between January and June 2000 in each community per number of employed individuals
in the working age population (16-64 years) living in that community. Figure b shows average log unem-
ployment duration for job seekers for non Swiss citizens whose native language is neither of the languages
spoken in Switzerland. Figure c shows shows the share non-Swiss residents.
Source: Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), Neuch^ atel.
We also provide descriptive evidence on immigrants who are neither German native speakers
nor Latin native speakers (whereof 29% immigrants from former Yugoslavia, 12% from Portugal,
and 11% Turkish immigrants). This group has a cultural background dissimilar from both the
Latin-Swiss and the German-Swiss culture. Thus comparing unemployment experiences of these
immigrants by Swiss language regions should not be driven by culture but should be attributed
to di®erences in the labor markets. Figure 6b reports unemployment duration of this group
of migrants. Clearly, the ¯gure shows that there are no salient di®erences in unemployment
durations for immigrants with a non-German and non-Latin cultural background, i.e. a group
of job seekers who do not share norms and views expressed by Swiss residents.13 This is a
second piece of evidence suggesting that labor market chances are similar on both sides of the
RÄ ostigraben.
The ultimate question refers to job competition among Swiss natives and non-Swiss immi-
grants. The Latin speaking area of Switzerland is characterized by a substantially higher share
of non-Swiss population than the German speaking area. Thus, competition for jobs is stronger
in the Latin-speaking area than in the German speaking are. Yet does this also hold for com-
munities located close to the language border? Figure 6c suggests that the migrant share is
balanced right at the language border. Both German speaking border communities and Latin
speaking communities are characterized by a migrant share on the order of 18 %. This evidence
13Table 7 con¯rms that there is no signi¯cant di®erence in log unemployment duration in a regression setting
that controls for canton dummies, individual characteristics, community characteristics, and labor market policy
controls.
19is consistent with symmetric job competition across the language border within Switzerland.14
Moreover, Figure 6 also suggests that regional sorting by immigrants is not relevant. First,
the migrant share is balanced at the language border, and second there are no di®erences in
unemployment duration at the langauge border.15
Taken together, ex ante evidence suggests that the language border does not separate labor
markets, that labor market chances are similar across the border, and that there is not di®erential
job competition between Swiss and non-Swiss migrants.
4.3 Assessing the RÄ ostigraben gap in unemployment
In this subsection we go one step further and provide results from regression analyses that
account in detail for regional di®erences in the economic and institutional environment. The
above descriptive graphical analysis did not control for socio-economic characteristics of indi-
vidual job-seekers, so the speci¯c reason for the observed border-discontinuity in unemployment
remains unclear. Therefore we investigate whether the barrier e®ect survives once we introduce,
sequentially, four groups of variables: (i) the composition of the unemployment pool with re-
spect to human capital and other socio-economic characteristics; (ii) labor demand conditions
(availability of jobs, vacancies, changes in jobs and ¯rms); (iii) community characteristics (age
structure, average education levels, and urbanization/agglomeration); and (iv) implementation
of labor market policies (treatment intensities with active labor market policies and sanction
rates).
Table 4 shows the estimated e®ect at the language border based on equation (3). All re-
gressions in Table 4 control for in°ow year and quarter, for canton (=state) dummies, and a set
of dummies for large cities.16 Introducing canton dummies is of particular importance in the
present context because cantonal borders are also institutional borders and because cantonal
dummies account for persistent regional di®erences in labor market conditions.
Column 1 includes a large set of individual characteristics in the regression (skills, sector
of last job, employment prospects assessed by the caseworker, previous earnings, family back-
ground, willingness to move to another region). Controlling for the above set of variables, we
¯nd a language border di®erential in log unemployment durations of .237 log points. Evaluated
at the sample mean, roughly 32 weeks, this is equivalent to a 7.5 weeks di®erence in average
durations of unemployment at the language border. This means that, after controlling for a
detailed set of characteristics, the estimated language barrier e®ect does even become somewhat
larger than the raw di®erential observed at the language border in ¯gure 4 above. The language
14One might argue that there is asymmetric job competition at the Swiss/French border. Note, however, that
we also ¯nd a strong di®erence in mean unemployment duration for bilingual cantons. Two of these three cantons
(Fribourg and Berne) do not have common borders with the national border between Switzerland and France.
Moreover, the national border lies in Alpine region for the third canton (Valais). Job competition is therefore not
an issue.
15Note that the share of non-Swiss who do not speak a language spoken in Switzerland is also balanced across
the language border reaching a level of about 6 %.
16We control for large cities because they may be driving the distance to border e®ects in the regressions.
20Table 4: The language barrier e®ect in unemployment durations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lndur lndur lndur lndur
Latin 0.237*** 0.241*** 0.244*** 0.215***
(0.039) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Distance -0.0317 -0.0987*** -0.0979*** -0.0948***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Distance¢Latin -0.0596*** 0.0143 0.00926 0.00205
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Constant 2.583*** 2.493*** 2.345*** 2.363***
(0.077) (0.208) (0.222) (0.224)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Community characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
Labor demand No No Yes Yes
ALMP controls No No No Yes
Observations 173072 173072 173072 173072
R2 0.123 0.126 0.126 0.126
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Latin =
majority in community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Distance = distance to language
border (in 100 kilometers road distance). All designs include control dummies for year,
quarter, canton (state) and for large cities. Other controls are individual characteristics (age,
marital status, no. of dependents, quali¯cation, employability, previous earnings, previous
industry and mobility). Community characteristics are education, sector, age and % of
people that speak another than the o±cial languages. Labor demand controls are number
of ¯rms, % change in no. of ¯rms and available jobs from 1998 to 2001 and vacancies per
working age population. Labor market policy controls are a community average of sanction
rates, ALMP assignment rates for training course, employment programs, and subsidized
jobs. Source: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal
Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
barrier e®ect is estimated using linear distance-to-language border trends, separately for the
Latin-speaking and the German-speaking side of the language border.
To check the robustness of this e®ect, the remaining 3 columns of Table 4 introduce addi-
tional controls. Column 2 controls for community characteristics (community education levels,
demographic structure, community size, and a dummy that indicates whether the community
belongs to suburbs of an urban center (agglomeration)). Although most of these variables (in
particular, age structure, education levels, and community size) have a statistically signi¯cant
impact on unemployment durations, introducing these additional controls does not change the
21magnitude of the language barrier e®ect. In contrast, the point estimate even increases slightly
to .241. Column 3 checks for labor demand conditions within cantons (i.e. in addition to per-
sistent di®erences in labor market conditions across canton that are captured by the cantonal
dummies). We introduce detailed community indicators to capture local di®erences in labor
demand. The number of available jobs in the community (in the base year 2001); the increase
in the number of jobs and the increase in the number of ¯rms at the community level between
the years 1998-2001; and the number of vacancies opened in a community between January and
June 2000 per employed resident in the working age 16-64 years. Introducing these detailed
labor market indicators does neither have a strong impact on the overall performance of the
estimated equations; nor does it have an impact on the estimated language barrier e®ect on
unemployment durations. It appears that di®erences in labor market conditions are well cap-
tured by the cantonal dummies. Column 4 includes indicators for di®erences in regional ALMP
treatment intensities (sanction rates, ALMP assignment rates for training courses, employment
programs, and subsidized jobs). Consistent with other studies, these variables contribute to
explaining unemployment durations. However, controlling for regional di®erences in ALMPs
does not contribute very much to an explanation of the observed di®erence in unemployment
durations at the language barrier. The coe±cient of the Latin-dummy decreases only slightly
to .215.
Why is the unemployment duration di®erential at the language border so stable? Intuitively,
this must be due to the fact that the characteristics we include in columns 1-4 are either bal-
anced on both sides of the language border, or that imbalances are quantitatively unimportant.
Detailed summary statistics in the appendix show that contrasting individuals just across the
language border reduces the imbalances across language regions considerably. Nevertheless, a
number of background characteristics remain imbalanced at the language border in ways that
are favoring job seekers on the Latin speaking side of the language border.17 Do the di®erences
in observed characteristics contribute to enlarging the di®erence in unemployment duration? To
shed further light on this issue we regress individual, community, labor demand, and ALMP
characteristics on log unemployment duration of individuals living on the German speaking side
of the language border. We then combine the German parameter estimates with the background
characteristics of the Latin speaking job seekers to predict unemployment duration of residents
of the Latin speaking side of the border { and vice versa for the German speaking side of the
language border. This allows assessing the overall contribution of imbalances in background
characteristics to the language border unemployment di®erential.
Figure 7 shows average actual log unemployment duration (solid lines) as well as average
predicted log unemployment duration (dashed lines) for both language regions using the proce-
dure outlined above. Results indicate that there is no noteworthy discontinuity at the language
border, neither in a regression based on German-Swiss observations to predict Latin-Swiss un-
employment duration nor vice versa. Moreover, both exercises suggest that the observed gap
17For instance, job seekers on the Latin side are slightly better quali¯ed, easier to place, and more mobile.
22in log unemployment is smaller than the one predicted using background characteristics. This
explains why results that do control for background characteristics identify a slightly larger
language border di®erential than those that do not account for background characteristics.
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Notes: negative=German-speaking part; positive=French-/Italian-
speaking part. Solid lines show actual log unemployment duration.
Dashed lines show predicted unemployment duration using data from
the German speaking part of Switzerland to predict duration in the
Latin speaking part and vice versa. Linear prediction. Source: Swiss
Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), Neuch^ atel.
We next look at the robustness of the estimated e®ect. Table 5 looks at the unemployment
di®erential at di®erent segments of the language border. Column 1 repeats the estimate of
column 4 in Table 4 for ease of comparison. In columns 2 and 3 we restrict the sample to ob-
servations along the German-French language border and the German-Italian language border,
respectively. That is, in column 2 we use only observation that (i) live in a French-speaking com-
munity or that (ii) live in a German-speaking community that has a French-speaking community
as nearest neighbor on the other side of the language border. In column 3 we use therefore only
unemployed from (i) Italian-speaking communities, or (ii) German-speaking communities that
have an Italian-speaking community as nearest language border neighbor.
It is interesting to see that the estimated coe±cient for the French-German comparison is
almost exactly the same as the one for the whole sample. This is support for the robustness of our
speci¯cation as the French-German language border accounts for the vast majority of the overall
language border. (In fact, the term "RÄ ostigraben" orginally refers to French-German language
border only). Column 3 shows that also for the Italian-German language border the point
estimate is very close to the baseline estimate of column 1, but is not statistically signi¯cant.
Notice, however, that the high standard error is due to the low number of observations on which
23Table 5: Sensitivity analysis: What parts of the border are responsible?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline French Italian Local Bilingual Bilingual
border border linear Reg. cantons PES (FE)
Latin 0.215*** 0.218*** 0.191 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.176*
(0.031) (0.033) (0.165) (0.055) (0.044) (0.091)
Distance (100km) -0.0948*** -0.0830*** 0.0777* -0.0918** -0.0884
(0.028) (0.031) (0.045) (0.047) (0.078)
Distance¢Latin 0.00205 -0.00432 0.221* -0.0036 -0.0353
(0.014) (0.016) (0.127) (0.019) (0.140)
Constant 2.363*** 2.474*** 3.125*** 3.445 1.598*** -0.378
(0.224) (0.249) (0.947) (1080.02) (0.456) (1.708)
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173072 121367 28886 93700 34528 3012
R2 0.126 0.133 0.110 0.120 0.100 0.097
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Latin = majority in
community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Distance = distance to language border (in 100 kilometers
road distance). Local linear Reg.: Observations are weighted with respect to distance to language border
(normal kernel weights with bandwidth h = 5km). Bilingual cantons = canton of Berne, Valais, Fribourg
(German / French cantons). Bilingual PES = public employment service o±ces with both Latin and
German speaking job seekers. All controls as in table 4.
Source: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO),
CH-2010 Neuchatel.
this estimate is based. Since we control for canton ¯xed e®ects, identi¯cation is based on a few
communities with a majority of the Italian-speaking residents in the canton GraubÄ unden.18
A method to measure the barrier e®ect very locally at the language border is to use local
linear regression. The result of this speci¯cation is reported in column 4 of table 5. Weighting
observations inversely to their border-distance yields a Latin-border e®ect that is only slightly
lower than the one of our baseline speci¯cation. Column 5 shows the Latin-e®ect when taking
only observations that live in one of the three bilingual cantons: Berne, Fribourg, and Valais.
That is, we are measuring the e®ect even closer to the language border. The Latin-border e®ect
is almost exactly equal to the one we estimated using local linear regression. The ¯nal robustness
check, conducted in column 6 of Table 4 analyzes whether our results remain stable when we
focus on bilingual public employment o±ces and include public employment o±ce ¯xed e®ects.19
18The only cantons where there are Italian-speaking communities are the canton Ticino and the canton
GraubÄ unden, located in the South and the South-East, respectively. The canton Ticino consists entirely of
Italian speaking communities. In GraubÄ unden, some communities are Italian, but the vast majority speaks Swiss
German.
19We do not control for distance to language border because all of these o±ces are located on the language
24This is potentially relevant as regional labor o±ces have some discretion about implementation
of active labor market policies. Including labor o±ce ¯xed e®ects still allows us to identify the
Latin-e®ect as there are some bilingual districts. It turns out that the point estimate shows still
the same order of magnitude than our baseline estimates of Table 4.
5 Cultural di®erences in work attitudes?
Above we have documented a very large di®erence in unemployment durations across language
regions. We have argued that standard explanations for regional unemployment di®erences
are unlikely to account for the Latin-border e®ect. To the contrary, accounting for observable
individual, labor-market and community characteristics, the border-e®ect does not disappear
but does even become slightly larger. In this section we go one step further and ask whether
the estimated Latin-e®ect can plausibly be interpreted as an e®ect of cultural di®erences in
attitudes towards work in general and job search behavior in particular. To make the case for the
culture explanation we proceed in three steps. First, we look at the particular channel by which
unemployed individuals ¯nd new jobs. Exploiting information available in the AVAM data base
we ask whether unemployed individuals in the German-speaking region are more likely to ¯nd a
new job by own initiative rather than by mediation of caseworkers in the regional labor o±ces.
This provides direct evidence on the extent to which search e®ort exerted by the unemployed may
account for regional unemployment di®erences. Second, we look at voting results from national
referenda related to weekly working time, vacations, and/or early retirement. If the Latin-
e®ect is driven by cultural di®erences in norms and values, we should see di®erences in voting
behavior not only between Latin- and German-speaking cantons but also at the language border
within cantons. Finally, if culturally transmitted work norms are a ¯rst-order determinant
of unemployment outcomes, we should see similar regional di®erences with respect to other
dimensions of labor supply: labor force participation and full-time vs part time employment.
5.1 Exit channels
Our ¯rst step exploits information available in the AVAM database on how a new job was started:
(i) whether this job was found by the unemployed worker him- or herself; or (ii) whether the
new job was mediated by the caseworker at the local labor o±ce. Studying the issue of how
unemployed individuals ¯nd a new job sheds direct light on the job search e®ort of unemployed
individuals.
Moreover, this analysis sheds further light on the issue whether di®erences in labor demand
may explain the estimated Latin-e®ect. The idea is this: if unemployment di®erences are due to
lower labor demand on the Latin side (because of job competition between migrants and natives
or discrimination of Latin speaking Swiss-residents by all employers), this should show up in
both exit channels. Firms are central both to jobs that job seekers locate themselves; and to jobs
border.
25Table 6: The importance of various exit channels at the language barrier
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Self Empl. Serv. Other
96.21% 48.30% 14.47% 33.44%
Latin -0.322*** -0.497*** 0.217*** -0.257***
(0.032) (0.047) (0.074) (0.042)
Distance (100km) 0.0742*** 0.157*** -0.101 0.0548
(0.026) (0.040) (0.067) (0.040)
Distance¢Latin 0.0105 -0.0285 0.0263 0.0402*
(0.015) (0.027) (0.045) (0.022)
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173072 173072 173072 173072
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. Latin = majority in community speaks French, Italian or Romansh.
Distance = distance to language border (in 100 kilometers road distance).
All: all exits from unemployment. Self: exits to jobs found by the job seeker.
Empl. Serv.: exit to job found by the public employment service. Other:
destination unknown (job or non-employment). All controls as in table 4.
Source: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000,
Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
that caseworkers at the employment o±ce mediate. In contrast, job seekers are clearly central
in locating jobs themselves, but their search e®ort is less crucial for jobs mediated by the public
employment o±ce. These jobs are assigned by caseworkers and job seekers who refuse to apply
for such a job run into the risk that their bene¯ts might be withheld. Hence strong regional
di®erences in the relative importance of exits to own-initiative jobs and exits to caseworker-
mediated jobs make us more con¯dent that cultural di®erences in work norms drive observed
di®erences in unemployment durations.
Table 6 presents the results of our Cox proportional hazard rate analyses. Note that the
dependent variable is no longer the duration of unemployment but the exit rate from unemploy-
ment. Hence the coe±cients of Table 6 have a di®erent interpretation than those in Table 4.
All models estimated in Table 6 control for the full set of variables (as in Table 4, column 4).
Column 1 reports the estimates of the single-risk model, Columns 2 to 4, report the estimates
of a competing risk model with three exit states (own-initiative job, caseworker-mediated job;
other exit).20 The estimate of the single-risk model in column 1 indicates that the overall exit
20This model assumes that the three competing exit hazards are independent conditional on information ob-
served in the dataset. This allows separate estimation of the three hazard rates. We do not expect results on
the Latin e®ect to be sensitive to the assumption of independence since these are identi¯ed from language border
contrasts.
26rate is .322 log points lower on the Latin-speaking side than on the German-speaking side of the
language border, consistent with our basic ¯ndings in Table 4. The estimates of the competing
risk model yields a particularly interesting result. The barrier e®ect is extremely high for job
¯nding rates on the unemployed worker's own initiative. The exit hazard rate is .497 log points
(roughly 40 percent) lower on the Latin-speaking side compared to the German-speaking side.
In contrast, the exit rate for jobs located by a local labor o±ce is .217 log points (roughly 24
percent) higher on the Latin-speaking side compared to the German-speaking side of the lan-
guage border. This could be due to the fact that there are more open vacancies on the Latin
speaking side of the border compared to the German speaking side of the border (see Figure 6).
The barrier e®ect for other exits is negative though only half as big as on exits to own-initiative
jobs. This result is intuitive as other exits do not only include exits from the labor force, but
also exits to own-initiative jobs that are not communicated to the local labor o±ce. This lets
us conclude that the Latin-e®ect for other exits might be a mixture between a negative e®ect
for those that ¯nd a job themselves, and an insigni¯cant e®ect for withdrawing from the labor
force. Taken together we ¯nd that the relative importance of the way by which unemployed
individuals ¯nd a new job changes strongly at the language border. This result is consistent
with the hypothesis that observed unemployment di®erences are driven by cultural di®erences in
job search behavior but are inconsistent with an explanation based on labor demand di®erences.
5.2 Voting on work-times
Our second step to look for the importance of cultural di®erences for unemployment is by re-
assessing regional di®erences in voting on work time regulations. Recall that Table 2 showed
much stronger support for work time regulations in the Latin speaking areas of Switzerland than
in the German speaking areas of Switzerland. If there is a cultural component explaining both
voting and unemployment, then there should also be a gap in support for work time regulations
at the language border. Figure 8 draws these voting results, using disaggregated information at
the community level by distance to the language border.
Panel a)-c) show average (weighted) community votes for the referenda on working-time
regulations ("intensive margin"), respectively for the 1985 vote whether to increase vacation
weeks (panel a); and the 1988 and 2002 votes on a reduction of regular weekly working hours
(panels b and c). These graphs tell a consistent story. In particular, there exists a large
discontinuity in voting behavior at the language border. The voting population with residence on
the Latin-speaking side of the language border votes also in favor of longer leisure as compared
to the German-speaking side. The situation is very similar when we look at voting results
concerning lifetime-work regulations. In panels d)-e) we see the results of the community votes
on the 1988 vote on the reduction of the statutory retirement age, the 2000 vote on easier access
to early retirement and the 2000 vote on leaving the retirement age for women at the current
level (rather than increasing it). In all cases, we see the same consistent picture. Residents on
the Latin-speaking side are much more in favor of leisure time than residents on the German-
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Notes: negative=German-speaking part; positive=French-/Italian-speaking part. This ¯gure reports
percentage of yes votes in national referenda or voter initiatives on work time regulations.
Source: data from Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), Neuch^ atel.
speaking side. This evidence is consistent with strong language border di®erences in voting
with respect to work time limits. Voting is of course endogenous taking into account the large
di®erences in regional unemployment. Note, however, that in the late 1980s Switzerland was
characterized by unemployment rates below the 1 percent level. Thus, even though there were
still regional di®erences in unemployment, voters are likely to have been less concerned by
the motive to generate employment for the unemployed. Nevertheless, we still ¯nd striking
di®erences in voting on work time regulations for the 1980s votes. This suggests that there is a
clear cultural break in attitudes towards work at the language border.
5.3 Labor-supply gaps at the RÄ ostigraben
The third step to make a case for the importance of cultural di®erences in work attitudes is a
look at other dimensions of labor supply. The idea is this: When cultural di®erences in attitudes
towards work are a ¯rst-order explanatory factor behind observed di®erences in unemployment
duration, we should see di®erences at the language border also with respect to other dimensions
of labor supply. We use the Swiss population census of the year 2000 providing results on both
Swiss men whose native language is a Swiss language and immigrants whose native language
is not one of the four o±cial Swiss languages. Public use ¯les of this data set are unique as
they provide information on the universe of the resident population in Switzerland. The large
number of observations makes it an ideal data set to explore the issue. Our focus is labor force
28participation or, more precisely, a dummy indicating whether or not an individual is employed
or unemployed (dummy takes value 1) or out of labor force (value 0).21
Table 7 provides results on unemployment duration, labor force participation, and full vs
part-time employment for Swiss men who speak a Swiss language, and results for migrant men
who do not speak a Swiss language, in the age bracket 16-64. Results consistently indicate that
labor supply is lower on the Latin side of the language border compared to the German speaking
side. Unemployment duration is 24 percent higher, labor force participation is 3 percentage
points lower, and the rate of full time employment is 1 percent lower among residents of Latin
border communities compared to what one would expect from German border communities.22
In contrast, labor supply of migrant men who do not speak a Swiss language does not di®er in
a statistically signi¯cant manner at the language border.
6 Vertical versus horizontal cultural transmission
The estimated Latin-e®ects in tables 4 to 5 are consistent with a large impact of culture on
unemployment. In general any e®ects of culture are a mixture between an individual's culture
inherited from the own family (vertical transmission) and the dominant culture of the individ-
ual's peers transmitted through social interaction, social networks, or social norms (horizontal
transmission). That is, culture can be transmitted vertically from the parents to their children,
but also horizontally from relevant peer groups. In this section we will disentangle these two
transmission mechanisms using the fact that there is variation in native language within lan-
guage regions. More precisely, there is a small (but non-negligible) fraction of individuals in the
Latin region whose native language is German, and vice versa. Therefore we can separate the
e®ect of being a Latin native speaker (vertical transmission) from the e®ect of living in a Latin
community (horizontal transmission).
Table 8 shows the relative importance of vertical and horizontal transmission for unemploy-
ment duration. Column 1 of table 8 repeats the baseline estimation from table 4, column 4.
Including a dummy for Latin native language into this regression (column 2) reduces the mea-
sured e®ect on the language border markedly. However, adding together the e®ect of vertical
transmission (MT Latin) and horizontal transmission (Latin) yields an overall e®ect of culture
quite similar to the one estimated in column 1. The coe±cients of column 2 do not account for
21Using employment (rather than labor force participation) as a dependent variable does not change the results
in Table 7. We also experimented with unemployment (both unconditional and conditional on being in the labor
force) as the dependent variable. Also in the unemployment regressions results indicate higher unemployment
probabilities in the Latin region. However, the year 2000 was a boom year with extremely low unemployment
rates (below 1.5 percent in both language regions). This is why we prefer to look at labor force participation as
the dependent variable.
22Focusing on bilingual cantons reproduces the same result. Further results (not shown) for labor market
entrants (15-24 years), prime-age workers (25-49 years), and labor market leavers (50-64 years) indicate that
labor force participation is more strongly reduced among entrants and leavers whereas the reduction of full-
time employment occurs among prime-age workers. Unemployment results also indicate a stronger e®ect among
younger age groups (25-49 years) than for older cohorts (50-59 years).


















Latin 0.215*** -0.0311*** -0.0115*** 0.0674 -0.0123 -0.00543
(0.031) (0.00333) (0.00353) (0.052) (0.0112) (0.00597)
Distance (100km) -0.0948*** -0.00364 -0.00153 -0.0138 0.000363 -0.00908*
(0.028) (0.00370) (0.00423) (0.047) (0.00806) (0.00529)
Distance¢Latin 0.00205 0.0201*** 0.0146** -0.00653 0.000660 0.00571
(0.014) (0.00647) (0.00725) (0.021) (0.0139) (0.00975)
Constant 2.363*** 0.946*** 0.833*** 2.942*** 0.765*** 0.927***
(0.224) (0.0206) (0.0302) (0.467) (0.127) (0.0506)
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173072 1718501 1445747 99093 198150 150331
R2 0.126 0.212 0.061 0.098 0.083 0.023
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Latin = majority in
community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Distance = distance to language border (in 100
kilometers road distance). Source: Data from Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO),
CH-2010 Neuchatel.
the fact that it could be harder to ¯nd a job in a region where you do not speak the dominant
local language. Therefore columns 3 and 4 repeat the analysis of columns 1 and 2 including
a dummy indicating whether the individual's native language di®ers from the dominant local
language. The estimated culture-e®ects do not change at all. Note, however, that our esti-
mate of having a native language that di®ers from the local language is surprisingly negative
(though relatively small). This could be a sign for a positive selection of individuals moving
to the other language region. Column 5 of table 8 takes into account that the percentage of
Latin speakers does not increase from 0% to 100% at the language border. That is, we deal
with a fuzzy RD design. Using a standard two stage procedure, we can extrapolate the e®ect on
unemployment duration that would arise when changing the percentage Latin speakers from 0%
to 100%. The results suggest that increasing the percentage of Latin speakers by 100 % prolongs
unemployment duration by 17 %. In contrast, interacting with Latin speaking parents increases
unemployment duration 10 %. This suggests that vertical transmission of culture is about half
as important as horizontal transmission of culture in explaining unemployment duration.
To check the robustness of our estimates further, table 9 takes a closer look at the e®ect of
30Table 8: Separating Horizontal and Vertical Transmission of Culture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
lndur lndur lndur lndur lndur
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
% Latin 0.173***
(0.046)
Latin 0.215*** 0.131*** 0.214*** 0.127***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033)
MT Latin 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.0981***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Distance (100km) -0.0948*** -0.105*** -0.0968*** -0.108*** -0.119***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Distance¢Latin 0.00205 0.00271 0.00251 0.00335 0.00278
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
MT 6= LL -0.0225 -0.0301** -0.0309**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Constant 2.363*** 2.338*** 2.368*** 2.343*** 2.327***
(0.224) (0.223) (0.223) (0.222) (0.219)
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173072 173072 173072 173072 173072
R2 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.127 0.127
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Latin =
majority in community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Distance = distance to language
border (in 100 kilometers road distance). MT Latin = native language is French, Italian, or
Romansh. MT 6= LL = native language is di®erent from community majority language. All
controls as in table 4.
Source: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistical
O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
vertical transmission of culture. Column 1 of table 9 repeats column 4 of table 8. Columns 2 of
table 9 looks more closely on the isolated e®ect of vertical transmission (own native language)
using a design where horizontal transmission is captured by community ¯xed e®ects. It turns
out that the estimate of vertically transmitted culture does not di®er from our estimate of
column 1. Column 3 estimates the same model using only data from the three bilingual cantons
(Berne, Valais, and Fribourg). This yields results very similar to the baseline speci¯cation of
column 1, though within bilingual cantons the vertical transmission e®ect at the language border
becomes somewhat more important. In column 4 we con¯ne the analysis to observations from
the city of Fribourg only. Fribourg is an interesting case because it is a bilingual city (with some
31more Latin-speaking than German-speaking individuals). People living in Fribourg share the
same environment and the same labor market, independently of their native language and as a
result of bilinguality there is no obvious disadvantage speaking a Latin or the German language.
Therefore we can estimate the e®ect of vertical transmission very comprehensively in this city.
It turns out that the vertical transmission within the city of Fribourg is on the same order of
magnitude than the corresponding e®ect estimated using data from whole Switzerland. This
evidence is consistent with adaptation eroding little of the values transmitted from parents to
children. Finally, in columns 5 and 6 of table 9 we look at the Latin and the German region
separately. The vertical transmission e®ect is identi¯ed contrasting natives and non-natives in
the Latin region (presumably leading to a downward bias if there is a native advantage), and the
native language e®ect is identi¯ed contrasting non-native Latin speakers with German natives
(leading to an upward bias). Thus, strong asymmetries in the native language e®ect (being Latin
native-speaker causes a labor market disadvantage) would indicate failure of identi¯cation. It
turns out that the estimated e®ect of being Latin native speaker is not statistically signi¯cantly
di®erent and quantitatively very similar in both language regions. This is consistent with the
key identifying assumption that there are no unobserved di®erences between movers and stayers
(see section 3).
To learn more about the relative importance of horizontal versus vertical transmission of
culture we look in more detail at the exit process from unemployment to a regular job. Using
exit-channel information available in the AVAM data, we now extend our analysis of table 6
above. In particular, we study whether an individual's own native language a®ects exit chan-
nels (own-initiative jobs versus caseworker-mediated jobs) in a di®erent way than the dominant
language of the resident community. Column 1 of Table 10 shows the result of the single-risk
analysis adding a Latin native-speaker dummy as a proxy for vertical transmission of culture.
Columns 2 to 4 show the results from the competing risk analysis with exit channel own-initiative
job (column 2), caseworker-mediated job (column 3) and other exits (column 4). (Notice that
coe±cients indicate the estimated e®ect on the exit rate, hence signs are di®erent from pre-
vious tables using unemployment durations as the dependent variable). The estimated e®ects
con¯rm our previous results. The single-risk analysis of column 1 shows that both horizontal
and vertical transmissions e®ects are (statistically and quantitatively) highly signi¯cant with the
horizontal channel being somewhat more important. More interestingly, we ¯nd that the e®ect is
driven by exits to own-initiative job. Both Latin-e®ects, own language and language region, are
signi¯cantly negative. Interestingly, being Latin-native speaker also reduces the probability of
leaving the unemployment register via "other exits". This result can be rationalized as follows:
Our sample consists of prime-age Swiss males, a group that is most likely in the labor force
and unlikely to leave the labor force. Hence "other exits" are mainly exits to jobs that are not
reported to the local labor o±ce. By de¯nition, only own-initiative jobs are not reported to the
local labor o±ce. Hence in this respect it is not surprising to see a negative impact of Latin
language also in this dimension.23
23We also estimated Cox regressions that are strati¯ed at the community level. These compare with the ¯xed
32Table 9: Sensitivity Analysis on Vertical vs Horizontal Transmission
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Community Bilingual Fribourg Latin German
FE cantons region region
Latin 0.127*** 0.114**
(0.033) (0.046)
MT Latin 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.147*** 0.107** 0.101*** 0.0852***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.034) (0.008) (0.021) (0.022)




MT 6= LL -0.0301** -0.0180 0.00795
(0.013) (0.013) (0.022)
Constant 2.343*** 3.337*** 1.475*** 5.248** 3.251*** 2.237***
(0.222) (0.546) (0.456) (0.086) (0.307) (0.416)
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173072 173072 34528 684 52317 120755
R2 0.127 0.086 0.101 0.125 0.120 0.105
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Latin = majority in
community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Distance = distance to language border (in 100 kilometers
road distance). MT Latin = native language is French, Italian, or Romansh. MT 6= LL = native language is
di®erent from community majority language. All controls as in table 4. Source: Data from Unemployment
Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
Do the baseline estimates of the Latin region and Latin mother tongue e®ects merely re°ect
past experiences of unemployment? To check whether this concern is important we use informa-
tion on the individual's past unemployment history available in the AVAM data. In particular,
Table 11 splits the sample into individuals who are experiencing their ¯rst unemployment spell
in the last 5 years and individuals who have experienced one or more spells in the last 5 years
before their current unemployment spell.24
Column 1 of table 11 repeats the baseline result of table 8 (column 4). Columns 2 and 3 repeat
this same regression when the sample is con¯ned to individuals without a previous unemployment
e®ects regression from table 9 in that they allow for di®erences in the baseline hazard by communities. Comparing
the strati¯ed estimates to columns 1-4 in Table 10 we ¯nd no noteworthy di®erences in the estimated e®ect of
vertical transmission of culture on exit rates.
24Notice that we have data on unemployment history back to 1993, therefore we can identify the exact number
of spells in the last ¯ve years for every unemployment spell in the data set.
33Table 10: Exit channels and Horizontal vs Vertical Transmission of Culture
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Self Empl. Serv. Other
96.21% 48.30% 14.47% 33.44%
Latin -0.229*** -0.390*** 0.173** -0.129***
(0.033) (0.048) (0.079) (0.047)
MT Latin -0.118*** -0.135*** 0.0579 -0.162***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.035) (0.023)
Distance (100km) 0.0877*** 0.171*** -0.107 0.0758*
(0.026) (0.040) (0.067) (0.040)
Distance¢Latin 0.0100 -0.0294 0.0258 0.0388*
(0.015) (0.027) (0.045) (0.022)
MT 6= LL 0.0226** 0.0115 -0.000654 0.0626***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.028) (0.017)
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173072 173072 173072 173072
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Latin = majority in community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Distance =
distance to language border (in 100 kilometers road distance). MT Latin = native
language is French, Italian, or Romansh. MT 6= LL = native language is di®erent from
community majority language. All: all exits from unemployment. Self: exits to jobs
found by the job seeker. Empl. Serv.: exit to job found by the public employment
service. Other: destination unknown (job or non-employment). Strati¯cation at
the community level. All controls as in table 4. Source: Data from Unemployment
Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010
Neuchatel.
34Table 11: The Role of Prior Unemployment Experience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lndur lndur lndur lndur lndur lndur
All 1
st spell not 1
st spell not 1
st spell not 1
st spell not 1
st spell
Latin 0.127*** 0.183*** 0.104** 0.0984** 0.0894** 0.0842**
(0.033) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)
MT Latin 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.0955*** 0.0964***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Distance (100km) -0.108*** -0.109*** -0.103*** -0.0959*** -0.0959*** -0.0890**
(0.028) (0.031) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Distance¢Latin 0.00335 0.0109 -0.000242 -0.000456 -0.00269 -0.00290
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
MT 6= LL -0.0301** -0.0213 -0.0327* -0.0315* -0.0311* -0.0298*
(0.013) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
No. of spells last 5 years -0.0587*** -0.0588***
(0.003) (0.003)
Avg. log dur last 5 years 0.0693*** 0.0693***
(0.004) (0.004)
Constant 2.343*** 2.871*** 2.294*** 2.569*** 1.905*** 2.180***
(0.222) (0.316) (0.290) (0.282) (0.288) (0.280)
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 173072 72034 101038 101038 101038 101038
R
2 0.127 0.174 0.107 0.111 0.110 0.114
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Latin = majority in
community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Distance = distance to language border (in 100 kilometers
road distance). MT Latin = native language is French, Italian, or Romansh. MT 6= LL = native language
is di®erent from community majority language. No. of spells last 5 years: Number of unemployment spells
in the 5 years prior to this spell. Avg. log dur last 5 years: Average log duration of unemployment spells in
the 5 years prior to this unemployment spell. All controls as in table 4. Source: Data from Unemployment
Register 1998-2003, Swiss Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
spell in the recent past (column 2) and individuals with one or more previous spells (column 3).
It turns out that the Latin-region e®ect is even stronger among individuals experiencing their
¯rst unemployment spell and lower for individuals with previous unemployment experience.
We do not see a signi¯cant di®erence of Latin native-language e®ect between groups with a
di®erent unemployment background. This means that vertical transmission of culture is not
driven by past unemployment history. In contrast, the horizontal cultural channel is sensitive
to the experience of unemployment.
Columns 4 to 6 of table 11 elaborate further on the role of previous employment history for
repeatedly unemployed job seekers. Column 4 adds information on the number of unemploy-
ment spells. Interestingly, both the native language and Latin region e®ect remain una®ected by
35adding controls for unemployment recurrence suggesting that there are no important di®erences
in terms of past unemployment recurrence between both Latin region and German region res-
idents, and Latin speakers compared to German speakers. Column 4 adds average duration of
unemployment spells in the past. Interestingly, both the vertical and the horizontal transmission
of culture channel are slightly lower compared to the baseline in column 3 that does not control
for past duration. This suggests that there are indeed di®erences in past unemployment dura-
tion. Importantly, these di®erences do in no way account for the salient and strong di®erences
in unemployment duration between Latin speakers and German speakers, and Latin region resi-
dents compared to their German region counterparts. Column 6 adds both past unemployment
recurrence and mean duration to the main regression model. Results indicate that both vertical
and horizontal transmission of culture remain statistically highly signi¯cant and quantitatively
important.25 We conclude that the Latin-e®ects (regional and own language) are quantitatively
important and not driven by di®erential unemployment histories between Latin and German
native speakers and Latin and German language regions.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the role of culture in explaining unemployment duration along the Swiss
RÄ ostigraben { the language barrier separating the German-speaking from the Latin-speaking
(i.e. French- and Italian-speaking) regions of Switzerland. Our strategy to identify an e®ect
of culture on unemployment relies on the idea that, while the RÄ ostigraben separates cultural
groups, it neither separates labor markets nor political jurisdictions. This idea is tested in
various steps. We ¯rst collect data on national votes in Switzerland that are associated with
limiting work time (weekly hours, duration of vacancies, and early retirement). We argue that
voting results are proxies of tastes for leisure. The data do not only indicate a strikingly higher
support for work limits on the Latin-side of the RÄ ostigraben. (The percentage of votes in 6
national referenda on work-time limits was between 13 to 23 percentage points higher { or 1.4 to
1.7 as large { in Latin-speaking regions as compared to German-speaking regions.). The voting
support also changes to a similar extent at the language border.
Second, to the extent that the language border is associated with a change in attitudes
towards work and tastes for leisure, the RÄ ostigraben lends itself to studying culture because
important segments of that border do not coincide with the borders of Swiss states. Hence, with
such quasi-experimental variation in tastes for leisure at the language barrier we can identify the
role of culture in explaining unemployment. We discuss in detail how alternative explanations
might contribute to the unemployment-gap at the RÄ ostigraben and ¯nd that this gap is unlikely
generated by di®erences in labor market conditions and/or changes in political jurisdictions. We
also ¯nd that di®erences in labor market policies cannot account for the discontinuous change
25Consistent with the previous literature, we ¯nd that longer durations in the past are associated with longer
current unemployment; and more spells in the past go hand in hand with shorter spells in the present (indicating
instable employment, i.e. frequent moves between employment and unemployment).
36in unemployment at the RÄ ostigraben.
As a third way to test for potential importance of di®erent tastes for leisure we exploit
information in Swiss unemployment register data about the way unemployed individuals ¯nd
a new job (by own initiative versus by mediation through local labor o±ces). Results indicate
that the bulk of the di®erence is driven by a lower exit rate to own-initiative jobs on the
Latin-speaking side. Finally, we document that individuals on the Latin-side do not only have
higher unemployment durations but there is also a gap in other dimensions of labor supply. In
particular, our ¯ndings indicate a substantial RÄ ostigraben-gap in labor force participation rates,
which is particularly large for younger and older individuals.
Our analysis also sheds light on the relative importance of horizontal versus vertical trans-
mission of culture. In this dimension we go beyond the epidemiological literature that has
concentrated on the vertical transmission mechanism (Fern¶ andez and Fogli, 2006, Fern¶ andez,
2007). As we observe individuals in the Latin region whose native language is German, and vice
versa, we can separate the e®ect of being a Latin native speaker (vertical transmission) from the
e®ect of living in a Latin community (horizontal transmission). We ¯nd that both channels are
of substantial importance, with the horizontal e®ect being roughly twice as large as the vertical
e®ect.
In quantitative terms, our analysis suggests that culture is an important predictor of unem-
ployment. Our horizontal estimate suggests that a change in the cultural environment from a
0 percent to a 100 percent Latin neighborhood increases unemployment durations by .173 log
points; and our vertical transmission estimate suggests that being Latin (rather than German)
native speaker increases the duration of unemployment by .098 log points. Evaluated at the
sample mean, the overall e®ect of culture is on the order of a 7 weeks di®erence in the average
duration of unemployment. Quantitatively, this is a very large e®ect. Taking as a benchmark
the estimate of Katz and Meyer (1990) { according to which a 10 weeks increase in maximum
bene¯t duration increases the average duration of unemployment by 1 week { our estimates
suggest that our estimated culture-e®ect is as large as the e®ect of a 1.3 years (!) increase in
maximum bene¯t duration.
Clearly, the "change culture" policy cannot be mandated whereas the "change unemployment
bene¯t generosity" policy can be. Does this mean that our results are irrelevant to economic
policy? We believe that the answer is no, for at least three reasons. First, our research sheds
light on the reasons for the tremendous di®erences in regional unemployment rates that have
puzzled policy makers and researchers for a long time. Second, having identi¯ed the role of
cultural di®erences in explaining unemployment we can now start thinking about how economic
policy interacts with culture. Third, cultural di®erences may also give rise to di®erent policies.
Understanding the reverse arrow of causation is a further topic of future research.
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40Appendix (Not Intended For Publication)
This appendix provides descriptive statistics on all variables used in estimating model 3.
All tables follow the same template. Columns 1-3 show means for all, job seekers in Latin
regions, and job seekers in German speaking regions. Columns 4-6 show the language region
di®erence in means, the language border di®erence in means, and the language border di®erence
within bilingual regions. Columns 4-6 therefore allow assessing to what extent background
characteristics are balanced.
Table 12 shows background information for individual characteristics (quali¯cation, sector
of last job, di±culty of placement, mobility, age, earnings, family characteristics and native
language).
Table 12: Summary statistics: Individual characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Latin German Di®erence Di®erence at border
All Bilingual cantons
Quali¯cation
% low quali¯cation .08 .09 .08 .01*** .01 .00
% medium quali¯cation .10 .10 .10 .00** -.03** -.03**
% high quali¯cation .82 .81 .82 -.01*** .02 .02
Sector of last job
% agrar .03 .03 .02 .01*** .02*** .02**
% construction .11 .11 .10 .00*** -.04* -.05*
% manufacturing .17 .15 .18 -.03*** .05*** .05**
% services .49 .48 .50 -.03*** .01 .03
% tourism .06 .07 .06 .01*** -.01 .03**
% other sector .08 .11 .07 .04*** .02** .01
Di±culty of placement (caseworker assessment)
% easy to place .20 .23 .19 .05*** .13*** .07***
% medium to place .64 .64 .63 .00 -.10*** .02
% hard to place .15 .11 .17 -.05*** -.04*** -.09***
Mobility
% no mobility .03 .11 .00 .11*** .00* .00
% daily mobility .89 .76 .94 -.18*** -.05*** -.08***
% mobility: parts of CH .04 .06 .02 .04*** .04*** .05***
% mobility: whole CH .03 .04 .02 .02*** .00 .02*
% mobility: abroad .02 .03 .01 .02*** .00 .01
Age and Earnings
Age 38.49 37.66 38.70 -1.04*** .10 -.11
Log insured earnings 8.49 8.42 8.51 -.09*** -.08*** -.08***
41Family characteristics
No. of dependents .96 1.01 .94 .07*** .12** .07
% single .51 .50 .52 -.02*** -.04** -.02
% married .37 .40 .36 .03*** .03 .01
% divorced .11 .10 .11 -.01*** .01 .01
% widowed .00 .00 .00 .00 -.00 .00
Mother tongue
% German native language .69 .05 .97 -.92*** -.83*** -.72***
% Latin native language .31 .95 .03 .92*** .83*** .72***
Notes: Latin = majority in community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Di®erence at the border
is estimated using linear speci¯cations. Source: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss
Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
The results suggest that individual quali¯cation levels do not di®er signi¯cantly at the lan-
guage border. It seems however, that on the Latin side of the border signi¯cantly more people
work in the construction and manufacturing sector and less in the services sector than on the Ger-
man side. This di®erence in sectoral composition of the unemployment pool could explain parts
of the persistently higher unemployment duration. Note also, that people seem to be slightly
more mobile, that is willing to travel to other parts in Switzerland, on the Latin speaking side.
This enforces the conclusion that we would rather expect shorter than longer unemployment
durations on the Latin side of the language border. Contrasting individuals within bilingual
cantons reduces the pre-existing di®erences considerably.
Tables 13 and 14 summarize di®erences in community characteristics (educational, sectoral
and religious structure as well as dimension and agglomeration status) and labor demand char-
acteristics (growth in jobs and ¯rms, vacancies), respectively.
Table 13 shows minor but statistically signi¯cant di®erences in sectoral structure at the lan-
guage border. These can be explanatory for the di®erent sectoral structure in the unemployment
pool. Religious structure and dimension of communities do also di®er to a large extent at the
language border. Again, going closer to the language border reduces the pre-existing di®erences
in means considerably. Communities are also slightly smaller on the Latin side of the language
border.
Looking at table 14 yields that especially the number of work places di®er somewhat at
the language border. Arguably, this re°ects the fact that communities are smaller rather than
weaker labor demand. Indeed, a more direct measure of labor demand { vacancies per employed
person{ does not show any signi¯cant di®erences at the language border. Moreover, the median
wage paid to employed workers is somewhat lower on the Latin side than on the German side
of the language border. This could, again, re°ect the fact that communities are smaller on the
Latin side of the border (absence of city wage premium). In sum, labor demand appears to be
quite balanced at the language border.
42Table 13: Summary statistics: Community characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Latin German Di®erence Di®erence at border
All Bilingual cantons
% primary education .18 .19 .18 .01*** -.01 .01
% secondary education .73 .70 .74 -.03*** -.02 -.03**
% other education .02 .02 .02 -.00*** -.00* -.00
% sector 1 .02 .02 .02 -.00** .01*** .01
% sector 2 .12 .09 .13 -.04*** -.01 -.01
% sector 3 .39 .38 .40 -.02*** -.04*** -.02
% age 25-29 .08 .08 .07 .00*** -.01*** -.01**
% age 30-34 .09 .09 .09 -.01*** -.01*** -.01***
% age 35-39 .10 .09 .10 -.01*** -.01*** -.01***
% age 40-44 .09 .09 .09 -.01*** -.00** -.00
% age 45-49 .09 .08 .09 -.00*** .00 .00
% age 50-54 .09 .09 .09 .00*** .00 .00
% age 55-59 .08 .08 .08 .00*** .00** .01***
% men .46 .45 .47 -.02*** -.00 -.01
% catholics .41 .49 .37 .12*** .04 .03
% protestants .39 .29 .44 -.15*** -.05* -.05
% other language .01 .01 .01 -.00*** -.00 -.00
Log no. of inhabitants 8.91 8.58 9.05 -.47*** -.46 -.67*
% agglomeration .54 .51 .55 -.05*** -.09 -.39***
Notes: Latin = majority in community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Di®erence at the border
is estimated using linear speci¯cations. Source: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss
Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
A ¯nal candidate for explanation of di®erences in labor market performance between lan-
guage regions is di®ering labor market policies.
There is some indication that sanction rates are higher in the German-speaking regions and
that they discontinuously fall at the language border. Similarly, assignment rates to employment
programs and subsidized jobs are somewhat higher on the German-speaking side as compared to
the Latin-speaking side of the language border. In contrast, training programs are more heavily
used on the Latin-speaking side. In sum, di®erences in ALMP-treatment intensities between
language regions and at the language border could have some explanatory power in explaining
the language barrier e®ect in unemployment durations.
43Table 14: Summary statistics: Labor demand
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Latin German Di®erence Di®erence at border
All Bilingual cantons
Log no. of work places 6.42 6.16 6.53 -.37*** -.51 -.69
% new jobs .06 .07 .06 .01*** .01 -.00
% new ¯rms .01 .00 .02 -.02*** -.02** -.02*
Vacancies per employed .13 .14 .12 .02*** .01 -.01
Log median wage 3.55 3.51 3.57 -.05*** -.08*** -.09***
Notes: Latin = majority in community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Di®erence at the border
is estimated using linear speci¯cations. Source: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss
Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
Table 15: Summary statistics: Active labor market policies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Latin German Di®erence Di®erence at border
All Bilingual cantons
% days in sanction .06 .04 .07 -.03*** -.01*** .00
% days in course .12 .12 .12 -.00*** .03*** .05***
% days in employment program .01 .01 .01 -.00*** -.00* -.00
% days in subsidized employment .11 .11 .10 .01*** -.00 -.01
Notes: Latin = majority in community speaks French, Italian or Romansh. Di®erence at the border
is estimated using linear speci¯cations. Source: Data from Unemployment Register 1998-2003, Swiss
Census 2000, Federal Statistical O±ce (FSO), CH-2010 Neuchatel.
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